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COVERAGE IN TRANSITION:
CONSIDERATIONS WHEN EXPANDING
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED
HEALTH COVERAGE TO LGBTI EMPLOYEES
AND BENEFICIARIES
Kathryn J Kennedy*

ABSTRACT

The rights of transgender individuals has been in the headlines during 2017
- ranging from President Trump 's tweet to announce a ban on transgender
individuals from serving in the military due to the "tremendous medical costs" to a
nationwide injunction imposed by a federal district court on the HHS regulations
that prohibit health-care discrimination against transgender individuals under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA).
There are three important reasons why transgender rights are in the news.
First, the Human Rights Campaign Foundation, designed to promote the lives of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, scores employers in its
Corporate Equality Index (CE!) based on their commitment to equal treatment for
LGBT employees. To achieve a 100% score in its 2017 CE!, an employer must
provide equal health coverage for transgender individuals without exclusion for
medically necessary care. This includes medical benefits and services related to
transgender transition (e.g., medically necessary services related to sex
reassignment). Second, the Seventh Circuit in the summer 2017 decision of Hively
v. Ivy Tech Community College held that Title VIJ's prohibition on sex
discrimination in the employment context extends to sexual orientation and gender
identity. Third, HHS' regulations prohibiting health-care discrimination against
transgender individuals became effective January 1, 2017. As a result of litigation,
the portion of those regulations that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender
identity are now subject to a nationwide ban. The Department of Justice's motion
requesting a remand and stay of the litigation so that HHS could reconsider its
opinion was granted by the federal district court, but the injunction remains in
effect.
This article discusses the issues facing employers who are considering
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expansion of their group health plans to include transition-related medical benefits
for transgender employees and their beneficiaries for the treatment of gender
dysphoria. Issues include federal and state discrimination laws, federal income tax
treatment, Title VII prohibitions on sex discrimination in the employment context,
and ACA 's prohibition against sex discrimination in the health care context. In the
backdrop, the Supreme Court has granted cert in the Gloucester County School
Bd. v. G. G. case, which will review Title !X's prohibition of sex discrimination in
the education context as a school board's policy required students to use the
restroom consistent with their birth sex, rather than their gender identity. As the
ACA incorporates Title /X's prohibition of sex discrimination into the health care
context, the Supreme Court's decision could have far reaching impact.
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INTRODUCTION

The issue of expanding group health coverage for an employer's
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) employees
and their beneficiaries has been evolving over time. Initially, the issue
of providing benefits to LGBTI employees surfaced in the 1990s in the
context of extending group dependent health coverage to employees
with same-sex domestic partners. When Massachusetts became the first
state to legalize same-sex marriages in 2004, employers faced the issue
of extending group health coverage to employees and their same-sex
spouses, in states were such marriages were valid. The issues of samesex spousal coverage was resolved after the Supreme Court issued its
rulings in US. v. Windsor 1 and Obergefell v. Hodges.2 Thereafter
employers who had not expanded group health coverage to same-sex
spouses of their employees felt obliged to do so; failure to do so would
subject them to claims of Title VII violations if coverage existed for
opposite-sex spouses. We have come full circle now as employer face
new concerns as to whether employer-provided health coverage should
or must include medical procedures necessary for a transgender
individual to transition to his/her gender identity, and if so, what tax
implications would result for the employer and the employee. Other
legal issues facing employers in the transgender context include dress
code policies, gender pronouns, and bathroom laws.
One reason for this issue surfacing now is the 2017 Corporate
Equality Index's (CEI) inclusion of medical benefits relating to
transgender transition by a business for purposes of scoring a 100%
score.3 That index is a method used by the Human Right Campaign
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. Juris Doctorate, Northwestern University
School of Law, 1980. Special thanks to my research assistant Benjamin Lee and to Associate
Director for Access and Organization Gregory Cunningham for their excellent support in this
endeavor.
I U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2017,
RATING WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (15th ed.
2016), https://perma.cc/67MJ-2MJZ. There are 327 of the Fortune 500-ranked businesses that
have official CEI ratings based on submitted surveys. Of these, 199 have achieved a 100% rating
(compared to 151 in the prior year), with 12 of the top 20 Fortune-ranked businesses achieving
this top score (e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Exxon Mobile, Chevron Corp., Apple). In 2014, the
HRC Foundation announced new criteria for the 2017 CEI, which would require a business's
medical plan to provide comprehensive medical coverage for services related to transgender
transition. In 2002, it launched a Corporate Equality Index (CEI) used to gauge an employer's
inclusion of LGBTQ employees within their communities and applied it to 319 employers. By
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(HRC) to rate businesses that promote lesbian, gay, bisexual;
transgender and queer (LGBTQ) inclusive policies and practices in the
workplace. The 2017 CEI had a record number of 515 employers
earning a top rate of 100%. 4 The Human Right Campaign (HRC)
Foundation is a not-for-profit entity focused on improving the lives of
and encouraging employer to adopt LGBTQ-inclusive policies and
practices.
As will be discussed in the article, better awareness, changes in the
public's perception, evolving research and medical evidence,
modifications in the regulatory agencies' perspective under the Obama
Administration, and shifts in demand have led to the expansion of
healthcare services and benefits for the transgender community.
Medicare, the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP),
state Medicaid programs, and commercial health insurer are all
reconsidering changes in their policies.s
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated
1.4 million adults (0.6%) in the United States have self-identified as
transgender in its 2014 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS).6 The survey asked individuals whether they viewed
themselves as transgender, and if so, whether male-to-female, female-·
to-male, or gender nonconforming. The 2014 estimate was double that
of a prior 2011 estimate that found approximately 700,000 individuals
(0.3%) who identified themselves as transgender.
This article examines the legal issues surrounding the expansion of
employer provided group health coverage to include transition-related
medical benefits for transgender individuals and forecasts what to
expect under the new Trump Administration. It begins with a glossary
of terms that pertain to the LBGTI community and will be used
throughout the article. It will then provide a background on the LGBTI
legal landscape - including what constitutes medical necessity and what
mandates exist under the federal nondiscrimination employment law of
Title VII and Affordable Care Act (ACA). It will discuss the legal
issues to be considered in expanding employer-provided health care
coverage to LBGTI employees and beneficiaries and how the executive
and judicial branches are likely to resolve such issues. It then ends the
2017, the number of employers measured by the CE! increased to 887, which included 327
Fortune 500 business, 102 Fortune 1000 businesses, 156 law firms, and 302 additional major
businesses.
4 Id.
5 See Andrew L. Naugle & Susan Philip, Transgender Healthcare Coverage: Prevalence,
Recent Trends, and Consideration for Payers, MILLIMAN (July 28, 2016),
https://perma.cc/DX2P-L YEP.
6 See Andrew R. Flores, et al. How Many Adults Identify as Transgender in the United
States?, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (June 2016), https://perma.cc/QB8R-9RA Y.
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article with some best practices for employers to consider in expanding
such coverage.

I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Glossary of terms

In the past, most soc1et1es regarded terms use such "sex" and
"gender" to be synonymous. A person's sex was assigned at birth as
either male or female based on their genitals. In this sense, sex was
viewed as a binary concept - only two fixed options - male or female.
Recent research in neurology, endocrinology, and cellular biology are
pointing to a broader biological basis for determining one's gender. A
2015 Fusion "Millenial Poll" (referring to individuals aged 18-34)
shows more of the millennials regarded gender as a "spectrum" rather
than a binary determination. 7
LGBTI is an acronym used to refer to lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender/transsexual and intersex individuals. There are four LGBTI
concepts that are usually referred to in the literature:

•
•

•

•

one's sex at birth (i.e., female or male);
one's gender identity (i.e., one's internal. sense of being a
male or female which may or may not be visible to others
and which differs from the sex assigned at birth);8
one's gender expression (i.e., how one person expresses
his/her gender identity to others, which could be through
dress, hairstyle, voice or body characteristics, to identify
one self as more feminine or more masculine);
sexual orientation (i.e., whether a person whose gender
identity is sexually oriented to another person of the same
sex): a lesbian as a female-identified person who has
homosexual orientation towards other females; a gay as a
male-identified person who has homosexual orientation

7 See Curtis M. Wong, 50 Percent of Millennials Believe Gender is a Spectrnm, Fusion's
Massive Millennial Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/S3Z8-728R.
8 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services defines "gender identity" as "an
individual's internal sense of gender, which may be male, female, neither, or a combination of
male and female, and which may different from an individual's sex assigned at birth. The way an
individual expresses gender identity is frequently called 'gender expression,' and may or may not
conform to social stereotypes associated with a particular gender. A transgender individual is an
individual whose gender identity is different from the sex assigned to that person at birth." See
Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 96, 31384 (May 18, 2016).
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towards other males; or a bisexual as a female- or maleidentified person who has emotional or sexual attraction to
person of the same or different sex).
These four concepts have resulted in six different categories of
individuals: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual, intersex,
and queer:
•
•
•

•

•
•

•

A lesbian is a female-identified person who has
homosexual orientation towards other females;
A gay is a male-identified person who has homosexual
orientation towards other males;
A bisexual is either a female-identified or male-identified
person who has sexual orientation towards the same or
opposite sex;
A transgender is a person whose gender identity, gender
expression or gender behavior differs from the sex he/she
was assigned at birth. Being a transgender person does not
imply any special sexual orientation. Thus, a transgender
person could have a homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual
orientation. Terms such as Trans male/Trans man/FTM
(female to male) refers to a person who is identified as a
female at birth now expressing identification as a male;
similarly, Trans female/Trans woman/MTF (male to
female) refers to a person who is identified as a male at
birth now expressing identification as a female.
A transsexual is a transgender person seeking to transition
from male to female or female to male.9
An intersex is a person who has both male and female sex
organs and other sexual characteristics.
A gender-fluid or genderqueer is a person who does not
identify with a single fixed gender or sees themselves as
being both male and female.

Other helpful vocabulary includes:
•

The term "cisgender" refers to a person whose gender
identity corresponds with the sex that he/she was identified
as having at birth.

9 According to the National Center for Transgender Equality, "transgender" is regarded as
an adjective and not a noun. Thus, it would be appropriate to refer to "transgender people," but
the term "transgenders" is regarded as inappropriate. See Transgender Terminology, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Jan. 2014), https://perma.cc/J59Z-RG9U.
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The term "gender non-conforming" is used to describe
individuals whose gender expression is different from
society's expectations related to that gender. For example,
society does not expect a male individual to be wearing a
dress or make-up.
The term "gender transition" (or "transitioning") is the
process in which a transgender individual begins to live
according to his/her internal identification of sex.

Gender transitioning can be a lengthy process. It may begin when
the individual decides to make social changes (e.g., coming out to
family, friends, and co-workers, hairstyle and clothing changes, using
new names and pronouns, and being socially recognized as another
gender). To the extent the individual wishes to make these social
changes in the work environment, the use of different bathroom
facilities becomes an issue for the employer. The transition may also
involve legal changes to public documents (e.g., changing one's name
on one's birth certificate or changing one's name on a driver's license
and Social Security records). States vary greatly as to how an individual
can change his/her gender marker on various documents. Thirty states,
plus the District of Columbia, require documentation from a licensed
professional in order to change one's gender marker. Io Nineteen states
mandate onerous proof of clinical treatment to change one's gender
marker; four states have unclear rules and policies regarding gender
marker; and twelve states require proof of sex reassigriment surgery,
court order, and/or an amended birth certificate to change one's gender
marker.11
Medical care provided in transitioning may involve treatments
ranging from procedures designed to make the individual look more
feminine or more masculine (e.g., electrolysis or shaving one's Adam's
apple) to undergoing sex reassigriment surgery to change one's genitalia
and breasts. What makes the issue confusing is that not all transgender
individuals transition in the same way - some are happy with making
social changes, but do not find it necessary to make physical changes to
their bodies, while others find it critical to make physical changes to
have their sex conform with their gender identity.

IO See Identity Document Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCED PROJECT (Aug. 30,
2017), https://penna.cc/RJT9-GHF3.
II Id.
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B. What is Transition-Related Medical Care?
Medical care related to gender transitioning may involve
procedures and supplies, such as hormone therapy, mental health
services, electrolysis and laser hair removal, and gender confirmation
surgery (GCS). Contrary to the norm thinking, there is no single
"transgender surgery." Hormone therapy allows individuals to develop
the secondary physical characteristics to reflect their internal gender,
which may take years to complete. For Trans women (to go from male
to female (MTF)), hormone therapy would involve taking estrogen and
anti-androgens to promote breast development; redistribution of body
fat and loss of muscle mass; changes in the thickness to body hair;
increased skin softness; and decreased libido and fertility. For Trans
men, (to go from female to male (FTM)), hormone therapy would
involve taking testosterone to produce thicker, oiler skin; increase
libido; stop menstrual periods; redistribute body fat and muscle mass;
deepen one's voice; and increase body hair.
Hormone therapy assists transgender individuals in developing the
secondary physical characteristics to reflect their gender identity. But to
truly change the sex of the individual, gender reassignment surgery or
GRS (e.g., mastectomy, gonadectomy, and genital reconstructive
surgery) is necessary to change the person's genitalia and/or chest to
reflect their identified gender. Breast augmentation or removal is
referred to as "top surgery," whereas altering of genitals is referred to as
·"bottom surgery."
To engage in hormone therapy, most states require a letter from a
mental health professional affirming that the individual has gender
dysphoria and is in need of such therapy.12 Gender dysphoria
(previously referred to as gender identity disorder or GID) is a
psychiatric diagnosis that is "characterized by an incongruence between
one's experienced/expressed gender and assigned sex at birth, and
clinically significant distress or impairment of functioning as a result,"
and such disparity persists for at least six months.13 Being a psychiatric
diagnosis, there is no definite medical test to confirm. The condition is
associated with "severe and umemitting emotional pain" and without
treatment, can lead to anxiety, depression, and other mental health
issues, including suicide.14 To qualify for sex reassignment surgery, the
individual must have a persistent, well-documented diagnosis of gender
12 See generally Transgender
https://perma.cc/T8ZK-N7LG.

Rights

in

the

United

States,

W!KIPEDIA,

13 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
14

id.
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dysphoria.
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH)
has developed Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual,
Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People (referred to as the
Standards of Care or Benjamin Standards of Care), which are now
accepted as authoritative standards of care by the American Medical
Association (AMA), the American Psychiatric Association (APA), and
the American Psychological Association (APA).15 WPATH is an
international association whose mission is to "promote evidence-based
care, education, research, advocacy, public policy, and respect in
transsexual and transgender health."16 The Standards of Care indicate
that treatment for gender dysphoria is "individualized," meaning that
what works for one person may not be the same as for another person. I7
For individuals with severe gender dysphoria, hormone therapy is
usually not enough. According the Standards of Care:
While many transsexual, transgender, and gender-nonconforming
individuals find comfort with their gender identity, role, and expression
without surgery, for many others surgery is essential and medically
necessary to alleviate their gender dysphoria. For the latter group, relief
form gender dysphoria cannot be achieved without modification of their
~primary and/or secondary sex characteristics to establish greater
congruence with their gender identity.IS
Many large employers use the WPATH Standards of Care because
they are relied upon in the HRC Corporate Equity Index scoring
process.19 Insurance companies also have guidelines as to what medical
15 WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE
FOR THE HEALTH OF JRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE:
7rn VERSION (2012), https://perma.cc/9ZR4-9NNA [hereinafter Standards of Care, Version 7].
Those "Standards of Care" set forth a "triadic" treatment sequence which includes hormonal sex
assignment (i.e., cross-gender hormones to effect changes in physical appearance to resemble the
opposite sex); "real-life" experience in which the individual has a trial period of living as a
member of the opposite sex; and sex reassignment surgery, consisting of genital sex reassignment
and/or nongenital sex reassignment (e.g., changes to nose, throat, chin, cheeks, hips so as to
produce a better resemblance to a member of the opposite sex).
16 See Mission
and Values, WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
TRANSGENDER HEALTH (WPATH), https://perma.cc/7EUU-MAJW. WPATH was formerly
known as the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA).
17 See Standards of Care, Version 7, supra note 15, at 5 ("What helps one person alleviate
gender dysphoria might be very different from what helps another person").
18 Id. at 54-55.
19 To achieve ten points out of the total 100 points under the 2017 CEI, an employer must
extend medical benefits to transgender individuals, including for service related to transgender
transition (e.g., medically necessary services related to sex reassignment, hormone replacement
therapies, medical visits and laboratory services, in accordance with the WPATH guidelines).
Other barriers to coverage must also be eliminated: no separate dollar maximums or deductibility
applicable to the coverage of sex reassignment surgeries and related procedures; if the provider
network does not have adequate specialists, out-of-network providers must be covered at in-
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treatment will be covered under their insurance policies. Employers
fully insuring their group medical benefits would be subject to such
standards.
II.

THE HEAL TH CARE CONTEXT

A. Group Health Plan Issues
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is the federal
law that regulates most employer's employee benefit plans - retirement
and welfare plans. While it imposes some specific rights and benefits
for the spouse of a plan participant in the retirement plan context (e.g.,
joint and survivor annuities as the normal form of payment for
payments under a pension plan for married participants), it imposed no
such mandates in the context of group health and welfare benefit
plans.20 ERISA has a broad preemption clause to preempt state laws that
attempt to interfere with its rules, but it exempts state insurance laws as
they relate to employee benefit plans. 21 Pre-Windsor, some state
insurance laws required that same-sex spousal coverage be offered
under an insured group health plan if opposite-sex spousal coverage was
offered. The question then turned on whether the group health plan in
question was insured or self-insured. Now that all fifty states must
recognize same-sex marriages, as a result of the Obergefell decision, the
rights and protections for same-sex spouses under state law must
continue to be protected under insured plans.
ERISA's Title II amended sections of the Internal Revenue Code
to provide tax preferences to certain employee benefits. In the context of
health plans provided through an employer, the Code excludes from
taxation the cost of the employer-provided coverage and any
reimbursements for medical costs to the employee and his/her
dependents.22 The Windsor decision extended this exclusion from
taxation for employer contributions for health coverage and plan

network rates, including coverage of travel and lodging expenses to such specialists; no other
serious limitations (e.g., limiting the number of surgeries or excluding reversals of sex
reassignment surgeries). There are five criteria in which an employer is evaluating for purposes of
the 100 points: 35 points for equal employment opportunities policies; 30 points for employee
benefits; 10 points for organizational LGBT competency; and 25 points for public commitment to
LGBT-specific efforts. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 14, 16-18.
20 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e) (2014); I.R.C. §401(a)(l l)(A)(ii) (2014).
21 29 u.s.c. §1144 (2006).
22 I.R.C. § 105(c) (2015) (permitting a federal exclusion from the employee's income for
coverage of the taxpayer's spouse or dependent).
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reimbursements for benefits which covered a same-sex spouse.23 As will
be discussed below, such exclusion presumes that the coverage and
reimbursements qualified as "treatments" that are "medically necessary"
pursuant to the standards of IRC section 213. Similarly, an employer
may take a federal tax deduction for premiums paid for group health
insurance or for medical reimbursements paid from a self-insured group
health plan.24
B. Employer's Health Plan Issues
In the context of coverage for transgender employees under an
employer-provided group health plan, three issues emerge:
Whether benefits for medical services and supplies relating to
gender transition can be denied on the basis that they are not medically
necessary for a person of the employee's gender as noted in the plan
administrator's record;
Whether the plan may simply have a blanket exclusion for benefits
for medical services and supplies relating to gender transition; and
Whether the plan may have blanket exclusion for non-transition
related care that would have an indirect impact on transgender
employees. For example, the plan should continue to cover surgery
unique to a male (e.g., prostate surgery) for a woman that has
transitioned from being a male to a female but continues to retain the
male body parts. The use of gender codes to reflect the employee's
transition eliminates this confusion for the plan administrator.
While BRISA is silent on these issues, one must look to
enforceable federal law that would apply in the self-insured group
health context or state law in the fully insured context to ascertain the
answers to these questions. Normally one would look to health
insurance claims data as a source of information as to whether
trans gender individuals are utilizing specific healthcare services if made
available to them. However, current claims-based information is not a
reliable estimate as to the number of individuals who are transgender,
who have gender dysphoria, and related health care utilization.
Milliman conducted a study of claims data covering 2 million lives over
a four-year period (2009 to 2012) and discovered only 0.04% of the
members had an insurance claim related to gender dysphoria.25 This
represents only a very small portion of the number of individuals selfreporting themselves as transgender in the BRFSS survey. Ten states
Rev. Rul. 2013-17 (2013).
I.R.C. §§106, 162 (2016).
25 See Naugle & Philip, supra note 5.
23

24
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(California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington) and Washington, D.C.
prohibit categorical exclusions of transition-related medical care for
insured plans within those states. 26 Eight states (California, Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and
Washington), plus the District of Columbia, require coverage of
transgender benefits for their state employee health plans.27 Twelve
states require gender transition health benefits for their Medicaid
populations. 2s
C. Medical Necessity

Transgender participants or beneficiaries under an employerprovided group health plan will undoubtedly seek medical and/or
psychological treatment for their transitioning covered by the plan.
Most group health plans offered by employers cover benefits for
services or supplies that are "medically necessary", thereby excluding
those deemed to be cosmetic in nature. What is "medically necessary" is
usually defined by the plan as reasonable and necessary services or
supplies for diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury. However,
courts and administrative bodies have been recognizing that medical
transition-:related services and supplies for gender dysphoria are now
acceptable medical treatments, in a variety of different contexts.29

26 See
Transgender Healthcare, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/transgender-healthcare.
27 Id.
28 Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (July 12, 2016),
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies.
29 O'Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 34 (T.C. 2010) (holding that hormone therapy
and sex reassignment surgery were "for the ... treatment ... of' disease for purposes of I.R.C.
§§213(d)(l)(A) and (9)(8) and not "cosmetic surgery" excluded from the definition of"medical
care" under I.R.C. §213(d)(9)(A)); M.K. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services,
92 N.J.A.R.2d (DMA) 38, 1992 WL 280789 (N.J. Adm. May 7, 1992) (allowing the payment of
Medicaid funds for the petitioner's sex reassignment surgery as it was medically necessary);
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015) (granting transgender plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction to have the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation provide access to adequate medical care, including sex reassignment surgery);
HHS Appeals Board: DHHS Medicare NHD 140.3 re: Transsexual Surgery (Docket No., A-1387, Doc'n No. 2576, May 30, 2014), (permitted Medicare coverage of transsexual surgery). But
see Mario v. P&C Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2003) (where plaintiff provided little
evidence to show medical necessity for gender reassignment surgeries).
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III. THE LEGAL CONTEXT

A. Federal Income Tax Context

I.R.C. §§105, 106 and 3121(a)(2) exempt from employer payroll
and federal individual income tax amounts that an employee or his/her
dependents received for medical care under employer-provided accident
and health plans. Similarly, IRC §213 provides an individual taxpayer
with a deduction from federal income taxes for expenses for medical
care for the taxpayer, his/her spouse, or dependent that is not covered by
insurance and that exceeds 7.5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. Those tax exclusions refer to medical care as defined in IRC
§213(d)(l).30 That definition includes amount paid for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of a disease or for the
purposes of affecting any function of the body. 31 It specifically excludes
costs associated with cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures,
unless the surgery or procedure is necessary to correct a deformity that
existed at birth or resulted from an accident of trauma. 32 In contrast,
cosmetic surgery is defined as any procedure designed to improve a
patient's appearance and which does not meaningfully promote the
proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness of disease.33
The issue of the federal income taxation of medical care related to
treatment for gender dysphoria was discussed in the 2010 Tax Court
case of O 'Donnabhain v. Comm 'r.34 At issue was whether hormone
therapy, sex reassignment surgery, and breast augmentation surgery
qualified for a medical expense deduction under IRC §213. Under the
facts of the case, O'Donnabhain was born a genetic male with
"unambiguous male genitalia," but was "uncomfortable" in that role
since childhood.35 As an adult, he married and fathered three children.36
After his marriage ended, O'Donnabhain's feelings to be female
increased and became more persistent, leading him to commence
psychotherapy sessions.37 After 20 weekly sessions, his therapist who
was a licensed independent ·clinical social worker (LICSW) and
psychotherapist diagnosed him with severe gender identity disorder

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See I.R.C. § 105(b) (2015) (referencing medical care as defined in§ 213(d)).
I.R.C. § 213(d)(l)(A) (2017).
I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2017).
I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2017).
See O'Donnabhain,supra note 29. at 53.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 35-36
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(GID).38 Following the WP ATH Standards of Care (previously referred
to as the Benjamin Standards of Care), his therapist referred him to an
endocrinologist for feminizing hormone therapy which resulted in
positive effects for him.39 O'Donnabhain then presented herself in
public as a female, changed her name, and changed her gender
designation and name on her driver's license.40 She underwent surgery
to feminize her face and also presented herself as a female at work. 41
Due to her anxiety over her male genitalia, her therapist concluded
that her prognosis without sex reassignment surgery was "poor," and
thus, referred O'Donnabhain to a board-certified plastic and
reconstructive surgery.42 A second licensed psychotherapist examined
0 'Donnabhain and offered a second recommendation for her sex
reassignment surgery, noting that the petitioner "appears to have
significant breast development secondary to hormone therapy."43The
referral surgeon agreed that the petitioner was a good candidate for sex
reassignment surgery, commenting in his notes that "examination of her
breasts reveal [sic] approximately B cup breasts with a very nice
shape."44 The surgeon then performed sex reassignment surgery on the
petitioner, as well as breast augmentation surgery so as to "more closely
resemble the breasts of a genetic female. "45 0 'Donnabhain then claimed
the expenses associated with her hormone therapy, sex reassignment
surgery, and breast augmentation surgery as an itemized deduction on
her tax return. 46
The Tax Court held that expenses for hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery for gender transition were deductible medical care
expenses under I.R.C. § 213, as they were incurred in treating a disease
or illness.47 In determining whether gender identity disorder (GID) was
a "disease" for purposes of I.RC. § 213, the court cited two case law

38 Id. at 36. THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.
2000 text revision) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR], published by the American Psychiatric Association
advocates a diagnosis ofGID if the "individual exhibits (1) a strong and persistent desire to be, or
belief that he or she is, the other sex; (2) persistent discomfort with his or her anatomical sex,
including a preoccupation with getting rid of primary or secondary sex characteristics; (3) an
absence of any physical intersex (hermaphroditic) condition; and (4) clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning as a result of the
discomfort arising from the perceived incongruence between anatomical sex and perceived
gender identity." See DSM-IV-TR at 581.
39 O'Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 39.
40 Id. at 39-40.
41 Id. at 40.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 41.
44 Id.
45 0 'Donnabhain, supra note 29 at 41.
46 Id. at 42.
47 Id. at 55.
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factors used in finding a "disease" in the context of mental conditions:
(1) a mental health professional's finding that the "condition created a
significant impairment to normal functioning, warranting treatment"48
or (2) a listing of the condition in a medical reference text. 49 The court
then noted that transition-related medical care was now recognized in
DSM, the primary diagnostic tool of American psychiatry, as a
diagnosis referred to as gender dysphoria. 50 The court also referenced
WPATH's Standards of Care, noting that they were recognized as
authoritative by the American Medical Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association.51
The court held that GID was a "serious, psychologically debilitating
condition," and that the plaintiffs condition according to the experts
who testified was "severe" under the DSM-IV-TR standards.52 Given
the testimony of her mental health professionals and the recognition of
GID in diagnostic and other medical texts, the court held GID was a
"disease" under IRC §213.53
To counter the respondent's assertion that GID was not a
significant psychiatric disorder, the Tax Court also noted that seven of
the U.S. Courts of Appeals rulings had held that severe GID was a
"serious medical need" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, which
requires prisoners to receive adequate medical care.54 It also noted that
no U.S. Courts of Appeals have held otherwise.55 It also cited to cases
that held sex reassignment surgery was not "cosmetic surgery" for

48 Id. at 55-57 (citing Fay v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 408 (1981); Jacobs v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 813
(1974); Fischer v. Comm 'r, 50 T.C. 164 (1968); Hendrick v. Comm 'r, 35 T.C. 1223 (1961).
49 Id. (citing Starrett v. Comm 'r, 41 T.C. 877 (1964)).
50 See Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (characterizing the DSM as the
"leading psychiatric diagnostic manual"). See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES (10th rev.) (classifying gender dysphoria as "a serious medical
condition") and DSM-V, supra note 13.
51 Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp. 3d 1164, 1170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that the
standards "address a variety of therapeutic options, including changes in gender express and role,
hormone therapy, surgery, and psychotherapy").
52 See O'Donnabhain, supra note 29 at 61.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 62 (citing Delonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003); Allard v. Gomez,
9 Fed. Appx. 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000);
Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); Phillips v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 932 F.2d
969 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'g 731 F.Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322,
325-27 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 411-13 (7th Cir. 1987); Maggert
v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that gender dysphoria was a "profound
psychiatric disorder")).
55 Id. However, an en bane court of appeals has recently held that denial of sex reassignment
surgery did not result in a deprivation of constitutional rights for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 106 (1st Cir. 2014) (en bane), cert. denied sub
nom. Kosilekv. O'Brien, 135 S.Ct. 2059, 191 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2015).
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purposes of State Medicaid statutes.s6
The court then moved on to the question of whether cross-gender
hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery, and breast augmentation
surgery "[treated]" GID within the meaning of I.RC. §§ 213(d)(l)(A)
and (9)(B). Under the WPATH "Standards of Care," hormone therapy,
sex reassignment surgery, and under certain circumstances, breast
augmentation surgery are prescribed treatments for GID.57 In cases of
severe GID, the court accepted the petitioner's expert opinion that sex
reassignment surgery was the only known effective treatment, as it was
supported by several psychiatric reference texts. ss Thus, the court
affirmed that hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery were "well
recognized and accepted" treatments for severe GID and thus "treated"
the disease within the meaning of I.RC.§ 2I3(d)(9)(B).59
But the Tax Court held that the petitioner failed to show why
breast augmentation surgery "treated" GID and thus denied the
deductibility of those expenses.60 The WPATH "Standards of Care"
recommended breast augmentation surgery for a male-to-female patient
if the physician determines that "breast enlargement after undergoing
hormone treatment for 18 months is not sufficient for comfort in the
social gender role."61 As the record indicated the petitioner's breasts
before surgery were "within a normal range of appearance" and that
there was no documentation regarding the petitioner's comfort level
with those breasts "in the social gender role."62 Thus, the court held that
the breast augmentation surgery did not "treat" GID within the meaning
of I.RC. § 213, and was merely to improve her appearance (i.e.,
cosmetic in nature).63 Consequently, it was excluded from deductible
"medical care."64 This case illustrates that the determination of whether
breast augmentation surgery was medically necessary turned on the
facts of the individual case.
While not an issue in this case, if an employer were to provide
medical coverage for services or supplies related to gender transition to
its employees, spouse or dependents based on the WPATH Standards of
56 Id. at 71 (citing G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App.
1978); Davidson v. Aetna life & Cas. Ins. Co., 101 Misc. 2d 1, 420 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979)). But see Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 759-61 (8th Cir. 2001) (denying
reimbursement of sex reassignment surgery under the State Medicaid plan as such surgery was
"cosmetic" and alternate GID treatments were available).
57 See O'Donnabhain, supra note 29 at 65.
58 Id. at 68-69.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 83.
61 Id.
62 id. at 72-73.
63 See O'Donnabhain, supra note 29 85.
64 id. at 73.
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Care, the gross income exclusion provided to employees for such
coverage under I.R.C. §§ 105 and 106 should apply as those provisions
explicitly cross-reference the same definition of medical care in I.R.C. §
213(d). Thus, if such coverage followed the protocol of the WPATH
Standards of Care, there should be no income tax consequences for
transitioning individuals for such medical services and supplies.
However, the WPATH Standards of Care do not automatically
recommend breast augmentation surgery for Trans Females, but instead
require the physician prescribing the hormones and the surgeon
document that breast enlargement after 18 months of hormone therapy
was not sufficient "for comfort in the social gender role."65 Similarly, an
employer would be entitled to a tax deduction for the premiums it pays
for group health insurance that is medically necessary or for the benefits
paid from a self-insured group health insurance that used a medically
necessary standard for payment.
B. Medicaid and Medicare Context

In the 1992 case of MK. v. Division of Medical Assistance and
Health Services, M.K. requested the New Jersey Medicaid Program
authorize her phalloplastic surgery (i.e., surgery to construct a penis and
scrotum for a female-to-male transition) in order for her to become a
male transsexual.66 Such surgery had been denied by the state through
its Chief Psychiatric Consultant, on the ground that it funded only
services "medically required for diagnosis or treatment of a disease"67
and that the surgery in question was "experimental and/or cosmetic and
no an essential part of gender alteration. "68 In affirming an
Administrative Law Judge's order, the Director of the Division of
Medical Assistance and Health Services held in favor of the petitioner,
M.K. Finding no New Jersey case law on Medicaid coverage of sex
reassignment surgery, it turned to the Eighth Circuit opinion of Pinneke
v. Presisser in which the court held that Iowa's absolute exclusion of
sex reassignment surgery from its Medicaid plan was an arbitrary denial
of benefits determine solely on this particular "diagnosis, type of illness,
or condition."69 It affirmed that court's reasoning that sex reassignment
surgery is the "only medical treatment available to treat a true
Id. at 39.
v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (OMA) 38,
1992 WL 280789 (N.J. Adm. May 7, 1991).
67 Id. at *4 (citing the New Jersey statute N.J.A.C. 10:49-1.5 (2010)).
68 Id. at *5.
69 Pinneke v. Presisser 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing Doe v. Minnesota
Department of Public Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816,820 (Minn. 1977)).
65

66 M.K.
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transsexual."70 Thus, it held that the decision as to whether this surgery
was "medically necessary" turned on the opinion of the treating
physician, not government officials.71 As a result of the testimony of
M.K. treating physicians that supported the concept of phalloplastic
surgery and the fact that the petitioner was a good candidate for the
procedure, the Director held that it was medically necessary and should
be covered under Medicaid. 72
In a May 2014 decision from the Department of Health and Human
Service (HHS) Appeals Board, the agency reversed its National
Coverage Determination (NCD), which had denied Medicare coverage
of all transsexual surgery under its "reasonableness standard." 73 An
NCD is a finding by HHS as to whether a service or supply is covered
by Medicare, which bars payment for services or supplies "not
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or
injury."74 In its prior determinations, the HHS regarded transsexual
surgery as "experimental" in nature due to the lack of long-term studies
and the high rate of serious complications resulting from such
procedures.75 However, due to the DSM-IV-TR's characterization of
transsexualism as a diagnosed medical condition, this evidence has been
rebutted.76 The new evidence also indicated that such surgery was safe.
This decision is further precedent that transition-related medical
treatment for gender dysphoria is medically necessary.
C. Cruel and Unusual Treatment for Purposes of the Eighth

Amendment

The Tax Court in the O 'Donnabhain decision referenced the U.S.
Courts of Appeals rulings that held that severe GID was a "serious
medical need" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. The Norsworthy

70 M.K. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services, supra note 66 at *4 (N.J.
Adm. May 7, 1991).
71 Id. at *8.
72 Id. at *9.
73 DHHS Medicare NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery (Docket No. A-13-87, Doc'n No. 2576,
May 30, 2014).
74 Id. (citing section 1862(a)(l)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l)(A)
(2016)).
75 Id. (citing to a 1981 report by the former National Center for Health Care Technology of
the HHS Public Health Service as to the safety and effectiveness of transsexual surgery).
76 Id. (quoting the DSM's description of GID as "a persistent discomfort with one's assigned
sex and with one's primary and secondary sex characteristics, which causes intense emotional
pain and suffering" and "if left untreated, can result in clinically significant psychological
distress, dysfunction, debilitating depression and, for some people without access to appropriate
medical care and treatment, suicidality and death").
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v. Beanf17 case from the Northern District of California is illustrative of

these rulings. In that case, the plaintiff was a transsexual woman who
was incarcerated at a state prison in California beginning in 1987 under
a sentence of seventeen years to life. 78 She began to identify herself as a
transsexual woman in the mid-1990s and was diagnosed with gender
dysphoria in January 2000. 79 She notified the prison staff as early as
1996 that she sought to have hormone treatment and an eventual
vaginoplasty, which is the definitive male-to-female sex reassignment
surgery. 80 She did receive years of hormone therapy and counseling; by
2012, her treating psychologist recommended sex reassignment surgery
as being a "clinical and medical necessity for her health and wellbeing."81 A physician with expertise in transgender patients
recommended that Norsworthy, who by then had contracted hepatitis C
due to a prison rape, discontinue the long-term use of hormone therapy
due to its effect on her liver function.82 Noting that removal from
hormone therapy would worsen Norsworthy's gender pysphoria, which
could result in serious depression, thoughts about suicide, or self-harm,
her physician thought sex reassignment surgery would reduce these
risks. It was not until Norsworthy learned about the Kosilek83 decision,
which granted an injunction to inmate Michelle Kosilek whereby the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections was required to provide sex
reassignment surgery for a prisoner with severe gender dysphoria, that
she submitted a Patient/Inmate Health Care Appeal, seeking "adequate
and sufficient medical care" for her gender dysphoria, including sex
reassignment surgery. 84 That appeal was denied after three levels of
review. Dr. Raymond Coffin, a psychologist assigned to the third level
of appeal, concluded that the documentation available in Norsworthy's
case did not indicate that sex reassignment surgery was "medically
necessary," as required by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations.85
Due to the denial, Norsworth filed for a preliminary injunction
requiring the defendants to provide her sex reassignment surgery on the
grounds that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying her
medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria in violation of the

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015).
Id. at 1169-70.
79 Id. at 1170.
80 Id. at 1172.
81 Id. at 1172-73.
82 Id. at 1173.
83 Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012), ajf'd, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir.
2014), rev'd en bane, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
84 See Norsworthy v. Beard, supra note 77 at 1173-74.
85 Id. at 1175-76.
77
78
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Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.86 To prevail
on the merits of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble
requires a showing of a deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of a prisoner.87 In the Ninth Circuit, this requires the petitioner (1)
to show a serious medical need that could result in future injury or
wanton infliction of pain and (2) a purposeful act or failure to respond
by the defendants to the prisoner's pain or medical need and the harm
associated by such indifference. 88
The court held that Norsworthy was likely to succeed in showing a
serious medical need. Dr. Ettner, an expert retained by Norsworthy,
testified that Norsworthy exceeded the WPATH criteria for surgery and
criticized Coffin's evaluation as it revealed "a profound
misunderstanding of, and lack of scientific information regarding, the
nature, assessment, and treatment of gender dysphoria."89 A second
expert retained by Norsworthy concurred with Dr. Ettner and stated
that, based on her medical records, she met the criteria established by
the WPA TH Standards of Care for sex reassignment surgery as a
medically necessary treatment.90 The defendant's expert remarked that
Norsworthy was unable to fulfill the Standard of Care that required her
to live in society as a woman for at least one year prior to surgery due to
her incarceration and regarded this surgery "always an elective
procedure."91 But the court rejected the defendant's arguments as the
evidence supported a conclusion that Norsworthy's untreated symptoms
of gender dysphoria can be a serious medical need.92 The court
criticized the opinion of the defendant's expert as he misrepresented the
Standards of Care and made generalizations regarding gender dysphoric
prisoners, as opposed to making an individualized assessment of
Norsworthy.93 The evidence also alluded that the surgery was denied
due to CDCR's blanket exclusion for sex reassignment surgery for a
transgender prisoner.94
In this decision, the district court affirms the use of the Standards
of Care in determining what is "medically necessary" for the treatment

86 Id. at 1180-81.
87

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).

88 See Norsworthy v. Beard, supra note 77 at 1185-86 (citing to the Ninth Circuit's opinion

in Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 109, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)).
89 Id. at 1186-87.
90 Id. at 1186.
91 Id. at 1179.
92 Id. at 1189.
93 Id. at 1192.
94 Id. at 1191.
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of trans gender patients. 95 It also shows the importance of applying those
standards to the individual in question with respect to his/her serious
medical needs. This court rejected the use of blanket exclusions and the
theory that sex reassignment surgery is always elective in nature.96
D. ERISA Context
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Mario v. P&C Food Markets,
Inc., 97 upheld the denial of an BRISA claim by a plan administrator for
gender reassignment services or procedures. A female employee, Margo
Mario, suffered from gender dysphoria and transsexualism and began
the transition process from female to male (from Margo to Marc).98
After receiving hormone therapy and a bilateral mastectomy, the
employee sought reimbursement from the employer's self-funded health
plan. The plan administrator denied coverage on the grounds that such
services were not "medically necessary," as required by the plan
document, and stated that any future claims for services related to
gender reassignment would also be denied.99 Mario filed suit against the
employer for violations under BRISA, Title VII, and New York state
law.100
As to the BRISA claim, the court made a distinction as to who had
the burden of proof, which depended upon the wording of the plan. To
the extent "medical necessity" was required for entitlement to the
benefit under the plan, the burden of proof would be on the plan
participant. In contrast, if the lack of medical necessity is found in the
"exclusions" section of the plan, the burden of proof would be upon the
plan sponsor.101 Such a distinction was not "particularly helpful" in this
case as "medical necessity" was required in the "summary of benefits"
section and in the "exclusions" section of the plan. Thus, the court
concluded that "[U]nless the contrary is specified," the phrase "medical
necessity" would refer to what was medically necessary "for a
participant patient," which involved an assessment as to what would be
suitable for this individua1.102 If the plan administrator could
demonstrate that "in the ordinary case," the treatment was not medically
necessary, then the patient has the burden of showing his/her case is

Id. at 1170-72.
Id. at 1187.
97 Mario v. P&C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, passim (2d Cir. 2002).
98 Id.at761-62.
99 Id. at 762.
100 Id. at 762-63.
101 Id. at 765.
102 Id.
95

96
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"the extraordinary one necessitating the treatment."103
The court held that the plan administrator had conducted a
substantial investigation as to whether such claims were eligible for
payment, doing research on the issue of transsexuals, inquiring into the
policies of other employers and insurers regarding such coverage,
consulting with medical centers specializing in transsexualism and
sexual reassignment surgeries, and talking with medical personnel
employee of the plan administrator (including a psychiatrist who viewed
sex reassignment for the treatment of gender dysphoria as cosmetic in
nature ).104 Thus, the court determined that the plaintiff had not refuted
evidence to contradict the plan administrator's determination that "there
was substantial disagreement in the medical community about whether
gender dysphoria was a legitimate illness and uncertainty as to the
efficacy of reassignment surgery."I05 As such, the plaintiffs case was
no different than an ordinary case and thus the ERISA denial for
benefits would survive a de novo standard ofreview.106
The controversy regarding treatment for gender dysphoria that the
Second Circuit was referring to arguably has been rebutted since 2002.
The American Medical Association (AMA) issued a resolution in 2008,
declaring its support for public and private health insurance coverage
for the treatment of GID as there was sufficient medical research that
proved the medical necessity of mental health therapy, hormone therapy
and sex reassignment surgery.101 In its resolution, it states "GID, if left
untreated, can result in clinically significant psychological distress,
dysfunction, debilitation, depression and, for some people without
access to appropriate medical care and treatment, suicidality and
death."Ios Likewise, the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
regards the treatment of gender transition surgeries as being medically
necessary and therefore recommends their coverage by public and
private insurers.109 The APA also opposes categorical exclusions of
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 766.
Id.
I07 Resolution on Removing Financial Barrier to Care for Transgender Patients, AM. MED.
Ass'N, https://perma.cc/ZF26-DBS9 ("An established body of medical research demonstrates the
effectiveness and medical necessity of mental health care, hormone therapy and sex reassignment
surgery as forms of therapeutic treatment for many people diagnosed with GID ... Therefore, be
it resolved that the AMA supports public and private health insurance coverage for treatment of
gender identity disorder.").
108 Id.
109 Policy on Transgender, Gender Identity, & Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS'N, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/transgender.aspx ("APA recognizes the
efficacy, benefit and medical necessity of gender transition treatments for appropriately evaluated
individuals and calls upon public and private insurers to cover these medically necessary
treatments").
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coverage for such medically necessary treatment when prescribed by a
physician.11 o The WP ATH affirms that medical procedures to confirm
the gender that the individual identifies with are not "cosmetic" or
"elective" or "for the mere convenience of the patient. I I I
While these policies refute the argument that gender reassignment
is not "medically necessary," the Mario case may provide a hurdle for'
transsexual individuals to the extent they need to establish that their
case is exceptional (i.e., different than the ordinary case).
If the group health plan is insured, ERISA does not preempt state
insurance law and some state insurance laws prohibit exclusions for
transition-related care under their gender nondiscrimination laws. For
example, California's Insurance Gender Nondiscrimination Act
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "sex" which "includes a
person's gender identity and gender expression. "Gender expression"
means a person's gender related appearance and behavior whether or
not stereotypically associated with a person's assigned sex at birth." 112
Similarly, the Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking of
Washington, D.C., issued a bulletin highlighting that the D.C. statute
prohibiting discrimination in health insurance includes discrimination
based on gender identity or expression. l 13 Connecticut mandates that
"medically necessary services related to gender dysphoria should not be
handled differently from medically necessary services for other medical
and behavioral health conditions."114 Other states with similar
prohibitions include Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
York, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.11s
110 JACK DRESCHER ET AL., AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON ACCESS TO
CARE FOR TRANSGENDER AND GENDER VARIANT INDIVIDUALS (2012), https://perma.cc/K8URMW23 ("The American Psychiatric Association (1) [r]ecognizes that appropriately evaluated
transgender and gender variant individuals can benefit greatly from medical and surgical
transition treatments, (2) [a]dvocates for removal of barrier to care and supports both public and
private health insurance coverage for gender transition treatment, (3) [o]pposes categorical
exclusions of coverage for much medically necessary treatment when prescribed by a physician.")
111 WORLD
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, POSITION
STATEMENT ON MEDICAL NECESSITY OF TREATMENT, SEX REASSIGNMENT, AND INSURANCE
COVERAGE TN THE U.S.A. (2016), https://perma.cc/GM8S-GSS4 ("The medical procedures
attendant to gender affirming/confirming surgeries are not 'cosmetic' or 'elective' or 'for the
mere convenience of the patient.' These reconstructive procedures are not optional in any
meaningful sense, but are understood to be medically necessary for the treatment of the diagnosed
condition. In some cases, such surgery is the only effective treatment for the condition, and for
some people genital surgery is essential and life-saving." (emphasis in original)).
112 Cal. Ins. Code§ 10140 (2012).
l 13 See Chester A. McPherson, Interim Commissioner, Bulletin 13-IB-01-30/15 (Revised)
(Feb. 27, 2014), https://perma.cc/SJ8W-6UR5.
114 State of Conn. Ins. Dep't, Bulletin IC-34, "Gender Identity Nondiscrimination
Requirements," (Dec. 19, 2013).
115 See
Transgender Healthcare, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/transgender-healthcare.
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Similarly, a federal district court upheld the plan administrator's
denial of a transgender participant's claim for short-term disability
benefits following breast augmentation surgery related to transitioning
from male to female.116 The plaintiff, Charlize Marie Baker, transitioned
from male to female, first undergoing hormone replacement therapy
which was covered under her employer's BRISA health plan.111 As a
result of the hormone therapy, Baker developed size B-C breasts, but
decided to undergo breast augmentation surgery (i.e., implant
surgery). I IS Baker then sought benefits from the plan administrator,
Aetna, from the employer's short-term disability plan for post-surgery
recovery. The plan administrator denied the claim on the grounds that
her surgery was not caused by an illness, injury, or pregnancy-related
condition, as required under the plan for benefits.119 Thus, the plan
administrator held that Baker's breast augmentation surgery was not
medically necessary to treat gender dysphoria because she had already
developed average-size female breasts as a result of the hormone
therapy, making the surgery unnecessary.120 It noted that hormone
replacement therapy allowed people transitioning from male to female
to grow breasts, while no similar alternative existed for people
transitioning from female to male. The court affirmed Aetna's
interpretation of the BRISA plan to be legally correct, and not an abuse
of its discretion, noting that Baker's initial claim described the surgery
as cosmetic and that Aetna had not treated male-to-female transitions
any differently from Baker's situation.121
These BRISA cases illustrates the difficulty plan participants and
beneficiaries may have in challenging medical necessity denials by plan
administrators. BRISA cases require the plaintiff to exhaust the plan's
internal claim procedures before proceeding to court for recovery of
benefits.122 The goal is to avoid premature judicial intervention.123 Thus,
it is critical for the participant or beneficiary to have a complete medical
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Baker v. Aetna, 260 F.Supp.3d 694, 2017 WL 1881309 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2017).
Id. at *I.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at *4.
121 Id. at *5; Baker v. Aetna, 260 F.Supp.3d 694 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
122 See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1974). See also U.S. Department of Labor claims procedure
regulations under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2017).
123 See e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1996); Hickey v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941,945 (4th Cir. 1995); Variety Children's Hosp. v. Century Med.
Health Plan, 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir. 1995); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974-75
(6th Cir. 1994); Communications Workers of Am. V. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Simmons v. Wilcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d
1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825-26 (1st Cir.
1988).
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record before the plan administrator, including evidence to rebut a
finding that such services are not "medically necessary." Also a plan
administrator's denial of benefits is often reviewed by the courts only
for abuse of discretion, as ERISA plans generally contain sufficient
discretionary authority for the plan administrator to interpret the terms
of the plan, and the courts use only the record before the plan
administrator in its review.124 While the ACA added revised internal
claims and appeals and external review processes applicable to group
health plans to ensure a full and fair review of the claim, it still
behooves the plaintiff to construct a complete record before a plan
administrator.1 25 The record should also contain sufficient testimony
from medical professionals to rebut any presumption that the medical
claims are not "medically necessary."
E. Recent Supreme Court Cases

Two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions - US. v. Windsor and
Obergefell v Hodges - have called into question how employers may
treat LGBTI individuals. The U.S. federal law regarding employment
discrimination - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")
- has also been evolving at the agency level (i.e., the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)) and with the federal
courts. The ACA has its own civil rights protections to prevent
discrimination in the context of health care.
The Supreme Court has decided two major cases involving LBGTI
rights in 2013 and 2015 - US. v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges.
The US. v. Windsor decision reviewed the constitutionality of the
federal law known as the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was
passed in 1996 in the wake of Hawaii's consideration of same-sex
marriages.126 Section 2 of DOMA provided that no state would be
required to recognize, for state law purposes, a same-sex marriage that
was valid as a same-sex marriage in another state, nor did the state have
to recognize state rights or claims arising under that relationship.121 This
permitted states to disregard the validity of a same-sex marriage that
was otherwise legal in the state in which the ceremony was performed
(the "state of celebration"). Thus, the marriage of a same-sex couple
legally married in a state did not have to be recognized by another state
124 See Conkright v. Frommert, 599 U.S. 506 (2010); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554
U.S. 105 (2008).
125 See Patient Protection and Afford.able Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2719 (1973). See also Labor
Reg. §2590.715-2719 (2015).
126 U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S._ (2013).
127 Id.
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if the couple moved to that state ("state of residence"). DOMA section 3
referenced the Dictionary Act for the definition of marriage for any
federal law, ruling, or regulation. Under the Dictionary Act, marriage
meant only a legal union between one man and one woman, and
"spouse" referred only to a person of the opposite sex who was a
husband or wife.12s
The constitutionality of DOMA section 3 was at the core of the
June 26, 2013, Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor.129
The case involved a federal estate tax refund suit initiated by a
surviving same-sex spouse unable to claim the marital estate tax
deduction under federal law, as it failed to recognize her valid same-sex
marriage executed in Canada. While the case involved federal estate
taxes for a same-sex couple, it had far reaching implications for all
federal law purposes.130 In Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down the
constitutionality of DOMA section 3 "as a deprivation of the liberty of
the person protected by the Fifth Amendment."131 Hence, it made it
clear that for federal law purposes, the federal government must
recognize same-sex marriages in states that recognize those marriages.
As DOMA section 2 was not at issue in this case, nor in the case of
Hollingsworth v. Perry,132 the Court did not have to address the issue of
whether a state could limit marriage to simply opposite-sex couples.
The Windsor decision had immediate implications for BRISA
plans, as BRISA mandates rules applicable to employer-provided
retirement and group health and welfare employee benefit plans. While
BRISA does not require spousal coverage under group health and
welfare employee benefit plans, some state insurance laws require that
same-sex spousal coverage be offered if opposite-sex spousal coverage
was offered under an insured group health plan. As BRISA preserves
state insurance laws from preemption, the effect of Windsor would
depend on whether the employee benefit plan was insured or selfinsured (and if insured, the state where the policy was written). Many
employee benefit plans used the DOMA section 3 definition of
"marriage" and "spouse," except for insured plans where the state
insurance laws required same sex spouses to be recognized. As BRISA
amended federal labor and tax laws, both the DOL and IRS regulate it.
For self-insured group health plans, if spousal coverage was being
offered to an opposite sex spousal, it would presumably now have to be
offered to a same sex spouse or face possible issues under Title VII and
Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2682-83.
130 Id. at 2683.
131 Id. at 2695.
132 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
128
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other anti-discrimination laws and/or policies. However, as will be
discussed below, sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title
VII and its protections extend to the employee himself/herself, not
his/her spouse. The Windsor decision was silent as to federal
recognition of same sex couples united under state civil unions or
domestic partnership laws. It has no direct application for transgender
rights other than language that could be cited as dicta that states would
have the right to declare whether transgender individuals could marry
an opposite sex or same sex individual.133
The Supreme Court took up the question of whether states could
deny marriage to same-sex couples in the June 26, 2015 decision of
Obergefell v. Hodges.134 By consolidating four cases from jurisdictions
that banned same-sex marriages and refused to recognize the validity of
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere, the Court considered whether
such bans and nonrecognitions violated the U. S. Constitution.135 In its
landmark 5 to 4 decision, it held that such state laws prohibiting samesex couples from exercising their fundamental right to marry and
prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into in
other jurisdictions violated the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.136
Thus, it permitted same-sex couples to marry in all 50 states and
directed the states to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in
other jurisdiction. For employee benefit health and welfare plans,
insured plans would be required to extend spousal benefit coverage to
same-sex spouses. For self-insured plans BRISA does not mandate
spousal welfare coverage, but employers offering coverage only to
opposite-sex spouses and not same sex-spouses have a significant risk
of being challenged under state and federal discrimination laws.137
Thus, most employers have extended their group health coverage to
same-sex spouses of plan participants. However, the results of
Obergefell led many employers to discontinue domestic partner
coverage under their group health plans as there was no longer a legal
barrier to same-sex marriages.
133 U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692-93 (2013) ("This [marital] status is a
far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other
marriages. It reflects both the community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.")
134 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
135 Id. at 2593.
136 Id. at 2602.
137 Todd A. Solomon, Brian J. Tiemann & Jacob M. Mattinson, Employee Benefits
Implications of Supreme Court Decision on Same-Sex Marriage, McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY,
LLP
(June
30,
2015),
https://www.mwe.com/en/thoughtleadership/publications/2015/06/employee-benefits-implications-of-supreme-court-_.
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The Obergefell holding did not create federal recognition of samesex partners united in a civil union or domestic partnership under prior
state law. Like the Windsor decision, it has no direct application for
transgender individuals other than language that could be cited as dicta
that transgender individuals may have a fundamental right to marry
under the Constitution.t38
IV. TITLE VII ISSUES

One of the three core statutes prohibiting employment
discrimination includes Title VII. 139 It makes it unlawful for a covered
employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment," or to "limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's ... sex."t40 That statute is administered by
the federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).141 At the time of passage of Title VII, the statute provided no
definition of the word "sex." As an aside, discrimination on the basis of
sex under Title VII must be because of the employee's sex. Thus,
failure of an employer-provided health coverage to grant benefits for
transition-related medical care to an employee's spouse or dependent
would presumably not be grounds for a Title VII action as the action is
not targeted based on the employee's sex.142 Hence, the complaint for
employment discrimination under Title VII would be from the
employee who is denied coverage for transition-related medical care.
But note, while the Eight Circuit in Tovar v. Essentia Health recently
dismissed a mother's complaint under Title VII and the state analog
(Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA)) against her employer and the
plan administrator for failing to provide coverage for her son's
transgender dysphoria treatment, it did allow the complaint to move
138 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 ("the Court has long held the right to marry is
protected by the Constitution ... Marriage is 'one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."').
139 The other two core statutes are The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 623 (2016) and The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1201 (1981).
140 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1991). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1991).
Distinctions must be made based on the qualification for the job and the person's sex.
141 Enforcement of the rights created under Title Vil are dependent upon the complaint filing
charges of discrimination and "exhausting" the administrative processes under the EEOC.
142 See Tovar v. Essentia Health, 857 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that the
protections of Title VII do not extend to discrimination against the plan participant's son).
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forward as a discrimination claim under the Affordable Care Act's
Section 1557 (to be discussed below).143
Courts have generally interpreted the term "sex" under Title VII to
refer to the physical and biological differences between males and
females.144 While the courts generally used the terms "sex" and
"gender" interchangeably, social scientists make a distinction. While
"sex" refers to the difference between males and females based on their
physical organs, "gender" is regarded as a broader term referring to the
outward appearances and gestures that one manifests in identifying
one's self as a male or female.
C. Gender Stereotyping

The Supreme Court held in the famous case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkinsl45 that "gender stereotyping" was considered sex
discrimination under Title VII. In that case, Price Waterhouse was
found liable for gender stereotyping a female employee by failing to
elevate her status to partner. In her evaluations by the other partners, she
was regarded as too aggressive, and thus in need of "a course at charm
school."146 She was advised that she should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry" in order to advance to partner level.147 By
refusing to advance Ms. Hopkin to partner status due to her failure to
conform to the employer's gender-based expectations, Price
Waterhouse discriminated on the basis of her sex. The Court held that
Title VII prohibits "in the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."148
Hence, discriminating against Ms. Hopkins because her actions did not
conform to her gender was prohibited under Title VII.

143
144

Id. at 775.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Supreme Court held that males
are also protected against employment discrimination because they are male under the same
standards that would be applied to women. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S.
75 (1998).
145 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
146 Id. at 256.
147 Id. at 235.
148 Id. at 250.
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C. Sexual Orientation

While many states and hundreds of municipalities prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Presidential Order
13160 prohibits such discrimination against federal employees, the
courts have long held that sex discrimination claims by gay and lesbian
employees are claims of sexual orientation, which is not protected under
Title VII. 149 But this distinction is less true in complaints where sexual
harassment is being alleged. ISO The courts have limited Price
Waterhouse to allegation of sexual discrimination when the individual
exhibits gender characteristics generally affiliated with individuals of
the opposite sex (e.g., attributing the characteristics of Ms. Hopkins'
behavior as masculine, while she was a female).151 This draws a line
between discrimination against a person perceived to be gay or lesbian which is not protected by Title VII - and discrimination against a
person because of her masculine or feminine gender characteristics.1s2
While courts have extended Title VII' s prohibition of race
discrimination to apply to an employee's association with a person of
another race (e.g., interracial marriage or interracial friendship), they
have rejected such "bootstrapping" in the context of discrimination
against an employee because of his/her spouse's sex or friend's sex.153
Hence, discrimination against a lesbian employee would not be
actionable because she was married to a same-sex spouse.
But the EEOC and some courts - most notably the Seventh
Circuit-have more recently taken a contrary position of whether claims
of sexual orientation discrimination and/or gender identity
discrimination may be classified as claims of discrimination "because of
sex" under Title VII.
149 See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); King v. Super
Serv., Inc., 68 F. App'x 659, 664 (6th Cir. 2003); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir.
2000) ("The law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that
[plaintiff] has no cause of action under Title VII because Title VII does not prohibit harassment
or discrimination because of sexual orientation"); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143-44 (4th
Cir. 1996); Dillon v. Frank, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *12 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) ("The
circuits are unanimous in holding that Title VII does not proscribe discrimination based on sexual
activities or orientation."); Williamson v. A.G.Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989);
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597
F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
150 See Oncale v. Sundowner Office Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (holding that samesex sexual harassment was actionable under Title Vil in the context of a hostile work
environment as "the conduct at issue was not merely tined with offensive sexual connotations, but
actually constituted 'discrimination ... because of ... sex."
151 See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
152 See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003).
153 See DeSantis Co., inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979).
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In the 2015 decision of Baldwin v. Department of Transportation,
the EEOC took up the issue as to whether a complainant's claim of
discrimination based on sexual orientation under Title VII was
actionable.154 The complainant argued that he was not selected for a
permanent position as a front line manager because he was gay (i.e., his
sexual orientation).155 The EEOC held that "sexual orientation is
inherently a 'sex-based consideration,' and an allegation of
discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of
sex discrimination under Title VII."156 Thus, if his employer took his
sexual orientation into account in an employment action, a complaint
for sex discrimination can be alleged. I 57 The EEOC argued a number of
theories to justify its conclusion. First, it reasoned that sexual
orientation cannot be understandable without reference to sex as it
refers to the sex of someone to whom one is sexually and romantically
related to. By discriminating against an employee due to his sexual
orientation, the employer is treating that employee less favorably
because of his sex.158 Second, sexual orientation discrimination is an
associational discrimination on the basis of sex because the employer is
treating the employee differently for "associating with a person of the
same sex."159 While such associational discrimination applies in the
context of race discrimination, it should not be limited solely to that
context, according to the EEOC. Third, sexual orientation
discrimination involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes as
prohibited by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse.160 Such claims
should be allowed to be made by gays and lesbians if they can
demonstrate they were treated adversely because of their sexual
orientation. Finally, sexual orientation discrimination and harassment
"[are] often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce
heterosexually defined gender norms."161 As such, discrimination based
on an employee's non-conformity with sex stereotypes (e.g., a gay male
not conforming to the gender stereotypes associated with males) is valid
sex discrimination claim. This reasoning was convincing to a federal
district court months later, although it dismissed the claims based on its

154 Baldwin v. Dep't. of Transportation, EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 44397641 (July
15, 2015).
155 fd. at *2.
156 Id. at *5.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at *6.
160 Baldwin v. Dep't. of Transportation, EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 44397641, at *7
(July 15, 2015).
161 Id. at *8 (citing Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403,410 (D. Mass. 2002).
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merits. 162
A few district courts followed suit allowing gay and lesbian
employees to allege discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
under Title VII.163 But the real "shake up" in jurisprudence came in
April of 2017, with the Seventh Circuit decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College.IM Previously, the Seventh Circuit in Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc. concluded that Congress had nothing more than
the traditional notion of 'sex' in mind when it voted to outlaw sex
discrimination, and thus sexual orientation was distinct from sex
discrimination. I 65
But in Hively, the full panel Seventh Circuit reversed the lower
court's dismissal of the complainant's sexual orientation discrimination
claim under Title VII. Hively was openly lesbian and was allegedly
discriminated against by her employer when her part-time position was
terminated and her employer failed to provide her with a full-time
position.166 Hively argued two theories for her contention that sex
discrimination included discrimination based on sexual orientation:
first, that she was treated differently only because of her sexual
orientation, and second, that she was discriminated against due to her
intimate associations with a person of the same sex.167
Justice Wood used three rationales to support Title VII's
prohibition against sexual orientation in Hively. First, she applied a
"comparative method" in interpreting the statute - asking simply
whether Hively's protected characteristic played a role in an adverse
employment decision.168 If Hively had been a man married to a woman
and all variables were the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to
promote her and would not have fired her. In the court's mind, that is
162 See Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 2015 WL 6560655, at *3 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (citing
Baldwin v. Dep't. of Transportation, EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 44397641, (July 15,
2015)).
163 See Terveer v. Billington, 34 F.Supp. 3d 100, 2014 WL 1280301, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
2014) (allowing a gay's claim for sex discrimination because his "sexual orientation was not
consistent with the defendant's perception of acceptable gender roles"; Golinski v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that "[s]exual orientation
discrimination can take the form of sex discrimination"); Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 894
F.Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (allowing the plaintiff to pursue a Title VII sex
discrimination claim because he was mistreated for "tak[ing] his [male] spouse's surname - a
'traditionally' female practice"). But see Evans v. Georgia Reg'! Hosp., 2015 WL 5316694, at *3
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2015) (stating it "simply not unlawful under Title VII to discriminate against
homosexuals or based on sexual orientation"), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL
6555440 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2015); Currie v. Cleveland Metro. Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 4080159, at
*3 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 2015).
164 Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
165 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
166 Hively, 853 F.3d at 340.
167 Id. at 345.
168 Id. at 345.
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"paradigmatic sex discrimination," as Ivy Tech is disadvantaging her
"because she is a woman."169
Secondly, the court used the Supreme Court's gender stereotyping
theory to apply to both gender conformity and gender nonconformity
situations. According to the court, Hively, as a lesbian, was the
"ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype" (in terms
of modem America, where heterosexuality is the norm) and thus any
"line between a gender nonconformity claim and one brought based on
sexual orientation" was simply "gossamer-thin."170 The discrimination
alleged here would not exist "without taking the victim's biological sex
(either as observed at birth or as modified, in the case of transsexuals)
into account."17 1 Thus, it viewed discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be based on assumptions regarding the proper behavior
for someone of a given sex. Hence negative behavior against a plaintiff
- woman or man - who "dresses differently, speaks differently, or dates
or marries a same-sex partner" is based on sex and therefore prohibited
by Title VII.172
Finally, the court agreed that association discrimination theory that
has been applied in the racial context applies equally to discrimination
based on color, national origin, religion, or sex, as the statute "draws no
distinction."173 In his concurrence, Judge Posner concludes that Title
VII's term "sex" refers both to gender and sexual orientation.174
The Seventh Circuit also references the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Obergefell in which it "challenged laws burden[ing] the
liberty of same-sex couples" demanding they now "abridge central
precepts of equality."175 The court concludes that it would take
"considerable calisthenics to remove the 'sex' from 'sexual
orientation. "'176
While the Second Circuit held in a 2017 case that an openly gay
male could proceed with a claim of gender stereotyping, its one panel
lacked the power to reconsider whether he could pursue a sexual
orientation discrimination claim under Title VII due to the circuit's

Id. at 345.
Id. at 346.
171 Id. at 347.
172 Hively, 853 F.3d at 347.
173 Id. at 349 (citing to Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2008) (allowing
a Title VII claim where a white male was treated adversely as a result of his marriage to an
African-American woman); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888,892 (11th
Cir. 1986) (allowing a Title VII claim where an employer failed to hire a white applicant due to
his marriage to an African-American woman)).
174 Id. at 353.
175 Id. at 350 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015)).
176 Id.
169

170
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precedent. 177 Two of the three judges on the panel concurred that the
Second Circuit should revisit its precedent in an appropriate case. I 78
C. Transgender or Transsexual Discrimination

For Title VII purposes, discrimination against transgender or
transsexual employees has been distinguished from sexual orientation
discrimination as such individuals may be undergoing an actual physical
or biological change to become a different sex. In the case of Schwenk
v. Hartford179, a prison guard assaulted a male-to-female transgender
prisoner who was going to seek sex reassignment surgery. The court
held that the male guard targeted the prisoner "only after he discovered
that she considered herself female" and was "motivated, at least in part,
by [her] gender."180 Relying on Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit
held that sex discrimination includes discrimination due to the failure to
"conform to socially-constructed gender expectations."181 As such
discrimination against transgender females "as anatomical males whose
outward behavior and inward identity [do] not meet social definitions of
masculinity" is discrimination "because of sex." 1s2
Similarly, in the case of Smith v. City of Salem, Smith was
"biologically and by birth male" but was transitioning to become a
female under the medical protocols of GID.183 With complaints from
co-workers that Smith was "not masculine enough," his employer
subjected him to psychological evaluations and eventually suspended
Smith. 184 The district court rejected Smith's complaint for sexstereotyping on the theory it really was an allegation of discrimination
based on "transsexuality."185 But the Sixth Circuit reversed and held
that discrimination against a transsexual for failing to act or identify
with his or her gender "is not different from discrimination directed
against [the plaintiff] in Price Waterhouse who, in sex-stereotypical

177 See Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195,
178 Id. at 202 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
179 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
180 Id. at 1202
181 Id. at 1201-02.

(2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

182 Id. (emphasis added). But cf Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 ( I st
Cir. 2000) (refusing to extend Price Waterhouse in the context of the bank's rejection of a loan
application by a biologically-male plaintiff dressed in "traditionally feminine attire" on the
ground his "attire did not accord with his male gender" as illegal sex discrimination under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691 f).
183 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F:3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
184 Id. 569-70.
185 Id. at 571.
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terms, did not act like a woman."186 Hence, the Price Waterhouse
definition of sex as "sex stereotype" was not limited to biological sex.
Thus, it permitted Smith to pursue his claim for relief under Title VII
for sex discrimination.
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer's firing of a
transgender woman was based on her gender non-conformity and thus
actionable under Title VJl.187 The employer felt that the employee's
appearance in woman's attire was "inappropriate," "unsettling," and
"unnatural."188 According to the court, "[t]he very acts that define
transgender people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes
of gender-appropriate appearance and behavior."189 Thus, the court
concludes there is an analogy between discrimination against
transgender individuals and discrimination on the basis of gender-based
behavioral norms.190 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed its position in a
2016 case of Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC. I 91
The EEOC relied on some of these cases in the 2012 complaint of
Macy v. Holder, ·where it clarified that allegations of discrimination
based on gender identity are recognizable under Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibition.in The EEOC interprets Title VII to protect
against discrimination based on a person's sex and gender - the latter of
which includes not only one's biological sex but the "cultural and social
aspects associated with masculinity and femininity."193 Thus, when an
employer discriminates against an employee because the person is
transgender, it is making a gender-based distinction, which violates
Price Waterhouse's assertion that "an employer may not take gender
into account in making an employment decision."194 Thus, intentional
186 Id. 574-75. But see Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that "sex" under Title VII is to be given its "plain meaning" and does not include
discrimination based on transsexualism).
187 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
188 Id. at 1320.
189 Id. at 1316-17 (quoting Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees
and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561,563 (2007)).
190 Id.
191 Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC., 641 F. App'x 883, 884 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that "[s]ex discrimination includes discrimination against a transgender person for
gender nonconformity.").
192 Macy v. Holder, EEOC DOC 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (April 20, 2012) (also
recognizing that such complains are to be processed under Part 1614 of the EEOC' s federal sector
EEO complaint process). The EEOC also cites a "steady stream" of district court cases that
protect against discrimination of transgender individuals on the basis of sex stereotyping, noting
Schroer v. Billinton, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008)). See also United States v. Southeastern
Oklahoma State Univ., No. CVI-15-324-C, 2015 WL 4606079 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2015)
(allowing Rachel Tudor's claim of sex discrimination to proceed due to the university's denial of
her tenure because of her trans gender status).
193 Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 at *16.
194 Id. at *19 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228,244 (1989).).
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discrimination against a transgender employee because he or she is
transgender is discrimination "based on sex" for purposes of Title
VII. t 95 Whether the EEOC' s above determinations change under the
Trump Administration remains to be seen. In his Twitter account,
President Trump in July of 2017 announced that he would reverse the
Obama administration's decision to allow transgender people to serve in
the military. He cited the "tremendous medical costs" associated with
transgender service personnel as the reason for the reversal. 196 On
August 29, 2017, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis announced a freeze on
President Trump's ban on transgender individuals serving in the
military so that a panel of experts could be assembled to provide advice
and recommendations in carrying out President Trump's directive. 197 In
the meantime, the policy regarding transgender individuals serving in
the military will remain in place.198
The Seventh Circuit in the Hively decision explicitly stated that the
discrimination alleged would not have existed without taking the
victim's biological sex into account, whether or not that sex was
determined at birth and modified "in the case of transsexuals."199 Hence,
it would clearly entertain discrimination against a transsexual as a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII. As the Supreme Court has not
explicitly ruled that Title VII protects transgender or transsexual
employees, the above cases show a trend in finding equal protection.
V. ACA PROTECTIONS AND HHS REGULA TIO NS

A. ACA Section 1557
The "rules of the game" changed for group health plans with the
passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Its Section 1557 prohibits
discrimination by any health program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance (referred to as covered entities) on the grounds of
race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability, by incorporating by

at *34-35.
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197 See Dan Lamothe, Transgender Ban Frozen as Mattis Moves Forward with New Review of
Options,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Aug.
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2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017 /08/29/pentagon-chief-mattisfreezes-trumps-ban-on-transgender-troops-cal ls-for-more-study/?utm_term=. 7cbbc3ec09e0.
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reference four federal nondiscrimination statutes.200 Given the
incorporation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
covered entities are required to provide individuals with equal access to
health programs and activities without discrimination on the basis of
sex. As such, it is the first federal civil rights law to prohibit sex
discrimination in health care. The scope of Section 1557 extends its
protections to the marketplaces. The Department of Health and Human
Service (HHS) was given authority to promulgate regulations to
implement Section 1557_201
HHS issued controversial proposed regulations under Section 1557
in September of 2015, thereby expanding the definition of "sex" for
purposes of the prohibition against sexual discrimination to include
sexual orientation and gender identity.202 It received 24,875 comments,
the majority of which were letters from individuals. It finalized those
rules in early 2016, affirming its prior view. The rules were generally
effective July 18, 2016, but changes to health insurance or group health
plan benefit designs were deferred until January 1, 2017.203
Under the final regulations, all health programs and activities, any
part of which received federal financial assistance, are covered.204
Generally, a health program or activity would include health services,
health coverage, and all operation of an entity principally engaged in
provided health services or coverage (e.g., hospitals and insurers).
Federal financial assistance includes any grants, loans, credits,
subsidies, and cost-sharing subsidies under ACA Title I and Medicare
Part D payments.2os Hence, it applies to an employer-sponsored plan
that is funded through the insurance by an insurer who participates in
the ACA marketplace, as well as a self-funded plan administered by an
insurer who participates in the ACA marketplace. Even if the plan itself
is not sold through the marketplace nor does it receive any federal
assistance, the plan is involved with an entity (i.e., the insurer) who
receives federal funding via the premium credits it receives for eligible
individuals who purchase insurance on the marketplace. Similarly, an
employer that sponsors a self-funded retiree health plan that applies for
200 42 U.S.C.S § 18116 (2010). Section 1557 specifically applies Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), The Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), the Age Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 94-135, 89 Stat. 728 (1975), and
. the Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
201 42 U.S.C.S §18116(c) (2010).
202 Proposed Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54172 (Sept.
8, 2015). See Summary of HHS's Final Rule on Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and
Activities, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q3WM-6PMG.
203 Nondiscrimination in Health Program and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,440 (May 18, 2016),
§ 92.1, at 31466 (May 18, 2016).
204 § 92.4, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31466-67.
205 § 92.4, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31467.
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retiree drug subsidy under Medicare Part D will be a covered entity
subject to Section 1557.
The final regulations define "on the basis of sex" for purposes of
discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, false
pregnancy, termination of pregnancy (or recovery from such
termination), recovery from childbirth or related medical conditions, sex
stereotyping, and gender identity. 206 It defines "gender identity" to mean
a person's internal sense of gender, which may be male, female, neither,
or both and which may be different from the person's assigned sex at
birth.207 The regulations defines "sex stereotypes" as stereotypical
notions of masculinity or femininity, which include expectations as to
how an individual should act (e.g., behavior, clothing, hairstyle,
activities, voice, mannerisms, or body characteristics) to represent or
communicate their gender to others.208 These stereotypes can include
expectations that an individual will consistently identify with only one
gender and that they will act in conformity with the gender-related
expressions stereotypically associated with that gender. For purposes of
Section 1557, a "transgender individual" as a person whose gender
identity is different from the sex of that person assigned at birth.
The regulations mandate that covered entities provide individuals
equal access to health programs and activities without discrimination on
the basis of sex.209 This includes treating an individual consistent with
their gender identity (including access to facilities) and not denying or
limiting health care services on the theory that the individual seeking
those services belongs to a different gender than the individual's sex
assigned at birth, gender identity, or recorded gender. 21 0 Hence, a plan
would presumably violate Section 1557 if it denied coverage for a pap
smear where medically necessary for a participant who identified or was
perceived as a male.
Regarding health plans' exclusions from coverage, the regulations
prohibit categorical coverage exclusions for all health services related to
gender transition, effective on or after January 1, 2011.211 The rule
views categorizations of all transition-related treatment as cosmetic or
experimental to be "outdated and not based on current standards of
care."2 12 The rule covers a "range of transition-related services" which
includes treatment for gender dysphoria and is "not limited to surgical
treatments and may include, but is not limited to, services such as
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 § 92.4, 81 Fed. Reg. at
209 § 92.206, 81 Fed. Reg.
210 Id.
211
212

31468.
at 31471.

§ 92.1, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31472.

Preamble, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31429.
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hormone therapy and psychotherapy, which may occur over the lifetime
of the individual."213 While the regulations do not affirmatively require
the covered entity to cover specific procedures or treatments for
transition-related care, when coverage for a specific service related to
gender transition is denied, HHS will consider whether coverage is
provided in other circumstances.214 For example, if medical services for
hormone therapy, mastectomy, or hysterectomy are covered by the plan
outside of the gender transition context, an explanation will be need to
justify their exclusion in the gender transition context. The regulations
affirm that covered entity can still impose a "medically necessity"
requirement for a covered service, without defining the scope of that
term.21s The regulations were effective beginning on or after January 1,
2017 for health insurance and group health plans.216 In the preamble to
the regulations, HHS references a study by the National Center for
Transgender Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
which found that more that "one-quarter of the more than 6,400
transgender and gender-nonconforming respondents reported ... being
denied needed treatment[,] ... being harassed in health care settings[,] .
. . [and] postponing medical care because of discrimination by
providers."217 As such, discouraging or postponing necessary treatment
could lead to negative health consequences.
Regarding the three issues facing group health plans that we began
with, any blanket exclusions for transition-related medical care would
be prohibited under Section 1157; any other blanket exclusions for nontransition medical care that would otherwise be covered outside the
gender transition context (e.g., a pap smear for a Trans male) would
have to be justified; but the use of a "medical necessity" standard would
be acceptable.
HHS has been enforcing Section 1557 since ACA's enactment and
its Office of Civil Rights (OCR) reports that insurance discrimination
complaints have been increasing, the majority of which are gender
identity discrimination cases.218 Section 1557 also provides a private
right of action, which does not require exhaustion of administrative

Preamble, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31435-36.
§ 92.207, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31472.
ld.
216 § 92.1, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31466.
217 Preamble, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31460 (citing Kellan E. Baker, Open Doors for All, Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity Protections in Health Care, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
(Apr. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/6D6F-9GQY.
217 ld. at 31466.
218 See OCR Enforcement under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act Sex Discrimination
Cases, HHS.GOV (Aug. I, 2016), https://perma.cc/B7CL-CR5W.
213
214
215
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remedies prior to filing suit.219
B. ACA 's Essential Health Benefits

ACA also requires non-grandfathered health plans in the individual
and small group market to cover a set of 10 categories of services,
referred to as "essential health benefits" (EHB).220 These include doctor
services, inpatient and outpatient hospital care, prescription drug
coverage, pregnancy and childbirth care, mental health and substance
use disorder, and many more. Under the regulations issued by HHS, the
issuer is not deemed to have provided "essential health benefits" if "its
benefit design, or the implementation of its benefit design, discriminates
based on the individual's ... other health conditions."221 While section
1302(b)(4) of the ACA directs HHS to address standards to be used in
defining EHB, including elements related to discrimination as to an
individual's age, disability, or expected length of life, the regulations
expanded discrimination to include race, color, national origin, sex,
gender identity, and sexual orientation.222 Thus, it is likely that these
regulations will be challenged as HHS expanded the scope of
discrimination for purposes ofEHB.
C. Challenges to HHS Regulations

Similar to HHS, other federal agencies have opined whether Title
IX's prohibition of "sex" discrimination (incorporated by reference by
Section 1557 of the ACA) includes gender identity. Title IX provides
that "[n ]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."223 The Department of Education
regulations implementing Title IX permit "separate toilet, locker rooms,
and shower facilities on the basis of sex"· provided the facilities are
"comparable" for students of both sexes.224 But in an opinion letter
dated January 7, 2015, the Department's Office for Civil Rights
interpreted the regulations to require schools to treat transgender

219
220
221
222
223
224
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students consistent with their gender identi1y.22s A similar opinion letter
dated May 13, 2016 was issued jointly by the U.S. Department of
Justice and a U.S. Department of Education, stating that Title IX
requires public school districts to permit transgender students access to
restrooms, locker rooms, and athletic teams of their choosing based on
their gender identity. 226
In the case of Gloucester County School Bd. v. G.G., the Fourth
Circuit took up the issue of whether a school board could initiate a
policy requiring students to use the restroom consistent with their birth
sex, rather than their gender identity.221 In that case, G.G., a transgender
boy sought to use the boys' restroom at his high school, but was denied
access due to a new school board policy banning such action.22s He sued
the school board on the grounds of sex discrimination in violation of
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.229
The District Court dismissed G.G.'s Title IX claim, as it would not
afford deference to the Department's interpretation of its own
regulations.230 The Fourth Circuit found the Department's interpretation
of its regulations as it applied to transgender individuals to be
ambiguous, and thus, not entitled to Auer deference "unless the Board
demonstrates that the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation or statute."231 As the regulations themselves were
silent on the issue of which restroom transgender individuals should
use, the Court did not find the Department's interpretation to be
"erroneous or inconsistent with the text of the regulation."232 In fact, the
Court noted that the interpretation was the result of the "agency's fair
and considered judgment" and that the Department had been enforcing
this position since 2014.233 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on ·
October 28, 2016 on this decision on three questions: (1) whether the
Court should retain the Auer doctrine, (2) if the Auer doctrine is
retained, should deference extend to an unpublished agency letter, and
(3) with or without deference to the agency, should the Department's
specific interpretation of Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 be given
225
Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadmima, Acting Deputy Sec'y for Pol'y, Off. for C.R., to
Emily Prince, Esq. (Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with Bricker & Eckler, LLP).
226 Letter from U.S. Dept. of Educ. & U.S. Dept. of Just., to Colleague, (May 13, 2016) (on
file with U.S. Dept. of Educ.).
227 G.G. v._Gloucester Cnty Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016); Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.
v. G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016) (recalling mandate and issuing stay).
228 G.G., 822 F.3d at 714.
229 Id. at 715.
230 Id. at 723.
231 Id. at 721 (citing to the Supreme Court's decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,461
(1997)).
232 Id. at 722.
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effect. As of yet, we have no resolution.
This case has relevance in a number of recent cases challenging
Section 1557 of the ACA. In the case of Robinson v. Dignity Health, a
district court grant a motion to stay a transgender employee's complaint
that an employer's denial of "sex transformation" surgery under its
health plan violated Section 1557 of the ACA and Title VII.234 The
employer intended to amend its health care plan beginning in January of
2017 so that it would no longer exclude treatment, drugs, services, and
supplies relating to sex transformations, but as of the date of the
complaint, it had not.235 Since the interpretation of Title IX "on the basis
of sex" (which has been incorporated into the text of Section 1557) is
before the Supreme Court, the court concluded a stay would "serve the
orderly administration of justice and simplify the issues of the
litigation."236 The court noted that the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Congress as providing "similar substantive standards" in ascertaining
the meaning of "on the basis of sex" for Title IX and Title VII
purposes.237
In contrast, in the case of Franciscan Alliance, Inc., et al. v.
Burwell, eight states and three faith-based health care providers sued
HHS and Secretary Burwell in late 2016 challenging the new rule
"Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities," as it would
require providers to perform and provide insurance coverage for gender
transitions and abortions, contrary to religious beliefs or medical
judgment.238 The court rejected extending Chevron deference to HHS's
interpretation of "sex discrimination" under the new rule, as the
meaning of "sex" in Title IX has long been held to refer to the
"biological and anatomical differences between male and female
students as determined at their birth."239 Thus, HHS' interpretation that
"sex discrimination" included discrimination on the basis of gender
identity contradicted existing law and thus, it had exceeded its statutory
authority in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.240 Thus, it
granted the plaintiffs' motions for a nationwide preliminary injunction,
enjoining HHS from enforcing the prohibition on discrimination on the
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bases of gender identity and termination of pregnancy under its new
rule.241 The ruling was issued on December 31, 2016 and has not been
appealed by the Trump Administration during 2017. As the injunction
does not prevent an individual form bringing a private lawsuit to
enforce his/her rights under the new rule, it may not have had a great
deal of influence on plan sponsors in changing health care coverage
beginning on or after January 1, 2017, so as to be consistent with the
new Section 1557 regulations.
Similarly, a group of Catholic organizations in North Dakota
sought to block the HHS regulations on the grounds that requiring them
to provide insurance coverage for gender reassignment surgery violated
their religious teachings and beliefs. In light of the nationwide
preliminary injunction imposed by the U.S. District Court in Texas, the
district court in North Dakota granted a similar preliminary
injunction. 242
The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a brief in the federal district
court for the Northern District of Texas in the Franciscan Alliance
lawsuit in May of 2017. It asked the court for a stay of the litigation and
a remand so that HHS may reconsider the regulation at issue.243 The
brief did not confess HHS's error, new evidence, or intervening events
to support the remand request, but stated that HHS had identified
"substantial and legitimate concerns" over the remand and stay. In
contrast, the Franciscan Alliance requested a rejection of such a remand,
but instead a ruling of summary judgment in their favor. 244 It requested
the court vacate the rule. The court granted the DOJ's motion for
remand and stay, affirming that its original preliminary injunction order
would remain in full force and in effect. 245
As mentioned earlier, the Eight Circuit in the Tovar v. Essentia
Health litigation allowed a mother's suit to continue against the
employer and plan administrator for sex discrimination under Section
1557 as the employer's plan categorically excluded coverage for gender
reassignment for her son's dysphoria.246 The Court made no mention of
the nationwide injunction against Section 1557 imposed by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern' District of Texas. Judge Benton
dissented with the holding as it pertained to allowing the Section 1557
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claim to proceed against the plan administrator.247 The District Court
had dismissed that portion of the complaint on the grounds that the
plaintiff did not allege an injury caused by or redressable by a thirdparty plan administrator, who was simply following the terms of the
plan it was administering.248 Judge Benton noted that the commentary
issued by the HHS's Office for Civil Rights would impose liability
under Section 1557 to the plan administrator only if it discriminated in
the administration of the plan, or had shared common ownership or
control with the employer, or it served as a "subterfuge" in allowing the
employer to continue to administering a discriminatory health plan.249
None of those facts were alleged by the employee in her complaint. On
June 7th, Tovar filed for a rehearing by all of the judges of the Eighth
Circuit, alleging that the three-judge panel erred in treating her claims
of sex discrimination under Title VII and MHRA the same.2so

VI.

CONCLUSION AND BEST PRACTICES

HHS is reconsidering its definition of sex discrimination for
purposes of Section 1557. Given President Trump's July 26th Twitter
announcement to reinstate the ban on transgender personnel serving in
the military in light of the "tremendous medical costs," this may signal
that HHS will decide that sex discrimination under Section 1557 does
not include gender identity. However, the Supreme Court has granted
cert in the Gloucester County School Bd. v. G.G. in which it may define
the scope of sex discrimination for purposes of Title IX (which is
incorporated by reference in Section 1557). For employers, many have
amended their group health plans to prohibit categorical exclusions for
treatment for dysphoria and to delineate what services and supplies will
be covered for transgender employees, their spouses and dependents, so
as to comply with the HHS regulations as of January 1, 2017. But unlike
pension and profit sharing plans covered by ERISA, there are no anticut provisions applicable to welfare plans covered by ERISA. Hence
what an employer covers in 2018 could be different and less desirable
than what was covered in 2017, but query whether employers will want
to do that.
As to the tax treatment of employer-provided medical coverage for
transition-related care, the Tax Court affirmed that coverage which is
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medically necessary to treat the disorder of gender dysphoria would be
excludable from federal income tax, whereas supplies and services
related to cosmetic treatments would be taxable. This leaves open the
question of what is cosmetic in nature - would electrolysis and shaving
of one's Adam apple be regarded as such. From the case law discussed
above, there are not many cases that delineate the line between what is
medically necessary versus what is cosmetic for a variety of different
contexts. Many large employers are providing medical coverage for
transition-related care and not imputing any federal income tax for such
coverage. Similarly, employers may take federal tax deduction for
medically necessary medical coverage for employees, their spouses, and
dependents.
Those employers concerned with their HRC CEI ranking have put
in place the full range of medical services relating to transgender
transition consistent with the WTP ATH Standards of Care. Beginning
in calendar year 2018 (for the 2019 CEI), all of the employer's plans
will need to exclude blanket exclusions for transition-related care and
provide comprehensive transgender benefits under the CEI scoring
process.2s1 Other employment practices considered to be "best
practices" by HRC include:
• Having non-discrimination policies that cover sexual
orientation and gender identify as protected classes with
respect to the full range of employment decisions (e.g.,
hiring, firing, and promoting);
• Having global non-discrimination policies and codes of
code for their employees who work outside the United
States;
• Establishing standards of conduct for supplies and vendors
that reflect the non-discrimination policies of the employer;
• Providing parity between benefits (e.g., health, retirement,
disability) for opposite-sex spouses and same-sex
partners/spouses and including transgender-inclusive health
insurance coverage for medically necessary treatment and
care;
• Supporting organizational policies that promote LGBT
inclusion (e.g., diversity training, LGBT metrics and
evaluation tools, and gender transition guidelines);
• Encouraging transgender employees, with guidelines
regarding supportive restroom/facilities, dress code and
documentation guidance. 2s2
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President Trump's tweet raises the issue of the cost of transitionrelated medical care costs. A 2015 study indicated negligible increases
in an employer's medical costs but that was due to the low utilization
rate by employees.253 However, as more employees and their
beneficiaries are becoming more open about their transgender status, the
utilization rate may rise.

253 Study covering transgender health care would be cost effective for
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://penna.cc/W86P-46A7.

insurance companies,

